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nition of the privacy approach to governmental compulsion will
have little effect on future interpretation of the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination.
PART III: STUDENT COMMENT: THE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE
The idea that an attorney should not be compelled to disclose
confidential communications made to him by a client has its
origins in ancient Roman law.249 Although the effect of Roman
tradition on English common law is difficult to determine, England by the eighteenth century was in search of a rationale for the
privilege, founded on the principle of justice and truth rather
than on Roman law's antiquated notion of chivalry's code of
honor. This newer justification for the privilege of barristers to
keep confidential their clients' words and deeds rested on the
theory that claims and disputes leading to litigation can most
justly and expeditiously be handled where clients have fully disclosed to their lawyers all details of their cases. If clients are to
feel free to make such disclosures, they must have assurance that
their attorneys cannot be forced to divulge confidential communi20
cations. 1
Common law courts of sixteenth century England provided
some measure of protection to a defendant (especially in a criminal action) when incriminating evidence was used against him.
In particular, an attorney could not be compelled to testify
against his client. 251 Both compulsory testimony and the attorneyclient privilege are deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. The
Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association,2512 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 2 3 and The Federal Rules
of Evidence254 all recognize the attorney-client privilege as an
integral part of our judicial structure. The continuing importance
of the attorney-client privilege is well stated by Simon Rifkind,
a former federal judge now in private practice:
249. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §87 (2d Ed. 1972); Radin, The Principlesof Confidential CommunicationBetween Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1928).
250. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §87 (2d ed. 1972).
251. 8 J. WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE §2290 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
252. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 4.

253. Rule 26 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE.
254. §503 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.
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If the Government looks over the lawyer's shoulder as he
writes to his client, or if the Government eavesdrops as the
client talks to his lawyer then the assistance of counsel is
warped, it is not effective. That is why the great masters of the
law have treated the attorney-client privilege with such great
respect...
On my personal totem pole, this privilege stands higher
than the privilege against self-incrimination. The latter privilege, as we all know, has been treated as the very symbol of a
civilized society. But I can visualize a free society, even a truly
great society, which does not enjoy this special immunity. I
cannot, however, visualize, I cannot conceptualize a free society
in which clients and attorneys cannot speak and write to each
other in confidence and in privacy. Indeed, that society is not
free in which its citizens do not, with accustomed confidence,
have recourse to their lawyers without doubt or trepidation.
I have said all this not to engage in vain rhetoric but to have
your Honor vividly appreciate that we are treading on sacred
soil, that every footprint is important and that what is done in
this area of the attorney-client privilege deserves the most meticulous and delicate concern of this court.2 5
II.

THE PRIVILEGE, THE TAXPAYER AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE
A.

The Nature of the Privilege

The classic definition of the attorney-client privilege as
stated by Dean Wigmore, provides:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his
insistence permanently protected from disclosure by himself or
by the legal advisor, except [to the extent] the protection be
waived. [footnotes omitted]26
Generally, privileged communications between an attorney
and client include any communication by the client to his attorney, or by the attorney to his client, in the course of a professional
employment relationship.27 The communication must relate to
the subject matter about which the attorney has been retained to
advise the client and which it is assumed has been elicited as a
255. Simon H. Rifkind arguing before Chief Judge Edelstein in United States v.
I.B.M., 170 N.Y.L.J. 4 (July 5, 1973).
256. 8 J. WI.MORE, EVIDENCE §2292 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
257. Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), afl'd, 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
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consequence of the relationship between the parties.256 The privilege, however, does not necessarily extend to all things about
which the attorney gains knowledge while acting as counsel. 259 For
information to be considered privileged, the attorney must have
acquired knowledge of the information by virtue of his relationship as an attorney or in anticipation of such employment.26
The attorney-client privilege assumes that communication
between the client and his attorney is intended to be confidential. 26' The client need not expressly require secrecy from his attorney. 2 2 It is noteworthy that the attorney-client relationship,
without more, does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The circumstances must raise the inference that the particular
communication was the sort intended to be confidential. 2 3 The
raising of such an inference is often negated where a third party
264
not an agent of the attorney is present.
B.

The Outer Limit in Tax Investigations

The attorney-client privilege is generally limited in use and
scope. With regard to federal income tax investigations, the key
to the privilege is the phrase "confidential communication." And,
it is at this juncture that the classic definition and the statutory
mandate of the Code collide. For it is without reference to or
recognition of the privilege that section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 broadly authorizes the use of an administrative
summons for the production of individuals and documents for
2 5
examination.
258. See Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972); Grauer
v. Schenley Products Co., 26 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
259. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963). See text accompanying notes 302-27 infra.
260. United States v. Barrow, 229 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Pa. 1964), affirmed in part,
reversed in part on other grounds, 363 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001
(1966).
261. 8 J. WimioRE, EVIDENCE §2311 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
262. Id.
263. Id.; see generally notes 372-86 infra and accompanying text.
264. Id.; see text accompanying notes 457-64 infra dealing with the accountant employed by the attorney.
265. §7602 provides in part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return . . . determining
the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . or collecting any
such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax . . . or any person
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Only once has the Service sought a direct holding that the
attorney-client privilege is inapplicable to 7602 proceedings. In
United States v. Summe,66 the Service sought an order compelling an attorney to respond to questions concerning the returns
of two of his clients. The government countered the claim of
privilege by asserting that the "privilege has no application to an
examination under section 7602."211 In a somewhat confusing
opinion, the court appeared to hold that since the privilege is
derived from common law and since there is little authority holding that the privilege does not apply to federal investigative proceedings, "it is therefore necessary that the court proceed on the
premise that the attorney-client privilege must be recognized at
'268

this investigation.

Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any attempt to
interpret the language of the statute. It can hardly be disputed
that Congress has the power to bar testimonial privileges in
agency proceedings. 9 Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that
the court should ignore the government's suggestion that the statute itself preclude the privilege.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has consistently contended that
the attorney-client privilege is unavailable in proceedings before
it.20
The Board reasons that it is simply actualizing a congressional mandate for "untrammeled powers of visitation" and
therefore doctrines of privilege must yield to the concept of the
having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing

entrieg relating to the business of the person liable for tax. . . or any
other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear
. . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and
to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to
such inquiry ....
The subpoena or summons is enforced by the government by filing an action in the federal
district court requesting compliance. See INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, §§7402 (b),
7604 (a). If the subpoenaed party has refused to comply because of a claimed attorneyclient privilege, he must base his defense in the district court enforcement proceeding on
the privilege.
266. 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
267. Id. at 926.
268. Id. at 927.
269. See Note, Privileged Communications before FederalAdministrative Agencies:
The Lawv Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 395, 403-4 (1964).
270. See FederalAviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§1377 (e):
The Board shall at all times have access to . . . all accounts, records and
memoranda, including all documents, papers and correspondence, nor or hereafter existing, and kept or required to be kept by air carriers . ...
See generally2 Av. L. REV. 17, 153.121 (1966) and Miller, The Challenges To the Attorney.
Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262 (1963).
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27
agencies' need to know. '
This argument was squarely before the court in Civil Aeronautics Board v. Air TransportAssociation of America 27 2 and was
disposed of summarily:

The attorney-client privilege is deeply embedded and is part of
the warp and woof of he common law. In order to abrogate it in
whole or in part as to any proceeding whatsoever, affirmative
legislative action would be required that is free from ambiguity.
The very existence of the right of counsel necessitates the
attorney-client privilege in order that a client and his attorney
may communicate
between themselves freely and confiden. 3
tially
At least until other cases are decided and digested, the
attorney-client privilege will remain available in agency investigations, except where there is specific legislation to the contrary.
III.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE

The word privilege itself connotes a somewhat bridled extravagance which might not be available but for some overriding
social, political or legal policy. Indeed, the attorney-client privilege can be distinguished from the exclusionary rules of evidence
because only the latter are designed to make adversary litigation
more efficient as factfinding tribunals. 24 Furthermore, the exclusionary rules of evidence may only be invoked by the person having an interest in the outcome of the litigation. 75 Privileges, by
contrast, attach to the person vested with an interest or relationship fostered by the privilege, even though not a party to the
litigation.26 Therefore, a client should have standing to intervene,
claiming the attorney-client privilege in an enforcement proceed271. See Memorandum of Plaintiffat 10, Civil Aeronautics Board v. Air Transport
Association of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
272. 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
273. Id. at 318.
274. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §73 (2nd ed. 1972). The exclusionary rules do not
apply to summoned evidence. Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) with
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855,860 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956)
(owner of books and papers in possession of third party had standing to quash subpoenas
directing a third party to produce them on the ground that compelled production would
be an unreasonable search and seizure). See also, Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 31 AFTR 2d
73-1075 (9th Cir. 1973); Grove, Suppression of Illegally ObtainedEvidence: The Standing
Requirement on Its Last Leg, 18 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 150 (1968); and White and Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970).
275. C. McCoRlICK, EVIDENCE §73 (2d

ed.

1972).

276. Id.
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ing of a section 7602 summons where his attorney is the defendant
holding the documents. 27
The exclusionary rules of evidence, which attach more frequently to constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges, are
nevertheless intended to preserve common law rights which have
not been abrogated by statute. Bouschor v. United States"' held,
inter alia, that an attorney could not assert fourth and fifth
amendment protections on behalf of a client who was not a party
to the proceedings. In that case, the taxpayer's attorney, who had
done no prior tax work for the client, was retained after the Intelligence Division had begun a federal income tax fraud investigation. Bouschor, the attorney, requested the taxpayer's accountants to deliver the taxpayer's papers to him and they promptly
complied. The special agent investigating the taxpayer issued a
section 7602 summons to Bouschor for the production of the taxpayer's papers. Bouschour refused production. The court, following Brady v. United States,279 held that "an attorney may assert
a constitutional privilege on behalf of his client . . .when the
2 '8 0
client is a party.
The results of Bouschor, when considered in conjunction
with a recent Supreme Court case, may be to deny the taxpayer
the opportunity to argue that his constitutional rights foreclose
discovery of documents pursuant to a 7602 summons. The Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States" ' has held that the
taxpayer is not entitled to intervene as a matter of right in summary proceedings brought to enforce an Internal Revenue summons directed to a third party for the production of records simply because it is the-taxpayer's liability which is the object of the
investigation.
In Donaldson, Mr. Justice Blackmun, in analyzing the applicable statutes, rules of procedure and cases wrote:
But this [statutory] language. . . is permissive only and is not
mandatory. The language recognizes that the District Court
... may allow the taxpayer to intervene. . . . But the
[Supreme] Court did not . . .pronounce, even when con277. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
278. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963). See generally text accompanying notes 158-65
supra.
279. 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957).
280. 316 F.2d 451, 458 (8th Cir. 1963).
281. 400 U.S. 517, 542 (1971). See generally text accompanying notes 95-116 supra
for an expanded discussion of intervention.
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fronted with a situation concerning an attorney's work product,
that the taxpayer possesses an absolute right to intervene in any
internal revenue summons proceedings. The usual process of
balancing opposing equities is called for. [W]e, thus, are not
in agreement with the holdings or implications. . . to the effect
that . . . a taxpayer may intervene as of right simply because
it is his tax liability that is the subject of the summons. Instead,
we agree with the opposing conclusion ....
"I

This conclusion appears to contradict directly the language
2 8 In that case, the
of Mr. Justice Clark in Reisman v. Caplan.
attorneys for a taxpayer requested declaratory and injunctive relief from a section 7602 summons issued to the taxpayer's accounting firm. The Court held, inter alia:
[T]hat in any of these procedures before either the district
judge or the United States commissioner, the witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include . . . the defenses that. . . it is protected by the attorneyclient privilege. In addition, third parties might intervene to
protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party
to the summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may intervene.28
282. Id. at 541-2. §7604 (a), entitled Enforcement of Summons, states in part:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify,
or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district
court . . shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.
Rule 81 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in part:
ITihese rules apply to proceeding to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an officer or agency
of the United States under any statute of the United States except as otherwise
provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the court in
the proceeding. [Emphasis added]
Rule 24 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that an applicant
may intervene:
• . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
It is extremely difficult to reconcile the above quoted statute and rules with Justice
Blackmun's statement quoted in the text. See note 281 supra.It is also interesting to note
that Justice Blackmun is the author of Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir.
1963) which held that an attorney could not assert fourth and fifth amendment protection
on behalf of a client who is not a party to the proceedings.
283. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
284. Id. at 449.
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The Donaldson court distinguished Reisman by concluding
that the statutory language was permissive only and not mandatory. Therefore, intervention should be denied when the circumstances are not proper. 28
What are proper circumstances for taxpayer intervention?
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention by right
"when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest
"286

The Donaldson court disposed of this rule by asserting that
the taxpayer's interest in quashing a summons issued to a third
party for the taxpayer's personal records is "nothing more than a
desire to counter and overcome [the summoned party's] willingness, under summons to comply and produce records. ' 2 87 This,

the Court concluded, is neither a "proprietary, nor a significantly
protectable interest" and, therefore, is properly raised at trial,
presumably by attempting to invoke the exclusionary rules of
evidence.288 Note, however, that the exclusionary rules of evidence
would not deny admission of the taxpayer's records where they
20
were properly summoned pursuant to a 7602 summons.

An example of such a result occurred in United States v.
Hickok.2 11 During the course of a criminal income tax fraud trial,

the defendant-taxpayer attempted to invoke the exclusionary
rule for evidence obtained by a section 7602 summons issued by
a special agent in a joint civil and criminal income tax investigation. The taxpayer alleged that the materials were obtained by
improper use of the administrative summons, solely to build a
criminal fraud case, and that this was a violation of the taxpayer's fourth amendment right to privacy and his fifth amend2
ment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. 11
285. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530 (1971).
286. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2).

287. 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971).
288. Id. See also Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 860 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
289. See United States v. Hickok, 481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973).
290. 481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973).
291. It is interesting to note that the Hickok court gave no consideration to the search
and seizure cases when discussing self-incrimination and privacy. See Vonder Ahe v.
Howland, 31 AFTR 2d 73-1075, 73-1079 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court stated:
ITihe suggestion that the presence of a search warrant, in and of itself removes
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The court, following Couch v. United States,2 2 found that
the summons was directed at the accountant for the production
of corporate records, and the taxpayer knew that information
from both his "personal and corporate" records would be disclosed in the appropriate tax returns, therefore, the court concluded that evidence could not be supressed:
[N]o Fourth or Fifth amendment claim can prevail where, as
in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy
and no semblance 2of93governmental compulsion against the person of the accused.
A recent case dealing with the right of intervention is United
States v. Kessler.294 In that case, Kessler, the secretary of a corporation, was summoned to produce corporate records in his possession which might bear upon the tax liabilities of certain shareholders of the corporation. Kessler argued, inter alia, that the
issuance of the section 7602 summons was a sham and a subterfuge, designed to obtain Kessler's personal records, and, under
the facts of the case, the summons was issued for an improper
purpose and in bad faith.
Kessler, in his effort to intervene in the district court enforcement proceeding, attempted to rely on Donaldsonfor the proposition that a section 7602 summons issued in bad faith will not be
enforced. 9 ' The court found, as did the Court in Donaldson, that
Kessler had neither a proprietary nor a significantly protectable
interest and that the special agent had not made a recommendation for criminal prosecution.2 6 Likewise, it was the court's opinion that Kessler did not sufficiently demonstrate the government's "bad faith" in obtaining the records: 97
The IRS has a right and a duty under the law to conduct
investigations when it suspects that violations of the tax laws
have occurred. Such investigations are in part, by their very
the impermissible aspects of compulsion [of a subpoena] is particularly untenable ....
See also Hill v. Philpott, 345 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) cited
in Vonder Ahe with approval at 73-1079. See generally text accompanying notes 215-227
supra.
292. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
293. Id. at 336.
294. 338 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
295. Id. at 424.
296. Id. at 425.
297. Id. at 427.
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nature, inquiries into the unknown. Under such circumstances
there will be frequent forays into areas that may ultimately
prove unproductive. Such efforts, however, do not constitute
bad faith.
Bad faith, in the Court's opinion, must include at the very
least evidence that the investigation of the [shareholders] is a
sham and fabrication; that the inquiry into the records of [the
corporation] has no relevance to such investigation; and that
this entire operation is a cover for what is really an unjustified
and vexing investigation of Barry L. Kessler. [emphasis added]
In neither Reisman, Donaldson,nor Kessler was the taxpayer
the owner of the documents involved nor was such an allegation
5 distinmade. The Supreme Court in Couch v. United States"'
guished Donaldsonunder circumstances where the taxpayer has
a proprietary interest in the records:
The [Donaldson] Court quite properly concluded that, under
these facts, no absolute right to intervene existed. [400 U. S.]
at 530-531. The instant case, however, presents a different question. Here petitioner does own the business records which the
Government seeks to review and the courts below did permit her
to intervene. The essential inquiry is whether her proprietary
interest further enables her to assert successfully a privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination to bar enforcement of the
summons and production of the records, despite299the fact that
the records no longer remained in her possession.

Where the attorney-client privilege is properly raised by the
attorney in a district court enforcement proceeding, it is unnecessary for the client to intervene in order to assert such a privilege
because the attorney is a proper party to invoke it."' Intervention,
however, apparently is necessary in order for the taxpayer to invoke constitutional guarantees, even when his attorney is in the
298. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
299. Id. at 327.
300. Donaldson and Couch apparently do not deny intervention where there exists
an attorney-client privilege or where the attorney refuses to intervene. Nevertheless,
Donaldson might deny intervention where the taxpayer has neither proprietary nor possessory interest in the documents or where the attorney merely extracts information from the
documents. Cf. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973) (Ainsworth, J.,
dissenting); United. States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). But cf. United
States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339,
344 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See
especially United States v. Moore, 73-2 USTC 9748 (5th Cir. 1973). See also notes 95116 and 228-48 supra.
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possession of potentially incriminating documents in which the
31
taxpayer has a proprietary interest.
The attorney-client privilege in tax investigations is extended only to "communications or conversations between the
attorney and his client and not to activities engaged in by the
attorney on behalf of his client.13 2 A number of court decisions
in peripheral areas touching upon the client's identity, the employment arrangement and the attorney's care of his client's records, have substantially limited the scope of the privilege. The
discussion of these various limitations on the attorney-client privilege assumes, ipso facto, that federal common law regarding the
attorney-client privilege governs and is determinative of its
scope. 03
A.

Protection of the Client's Identity

Generally, the identity of the client is excepted from the
attorney-client privilege. 4 The rationale for this principle is derived from the belief that, in an adversary proceeding, the opposing litigant is entitled to know the identity of the person instigating the litigation, and that it would be extraordinary, indeed, for
a client to communicate his identity to his attorney in confid30 5
ence.
There have been rather unusual situations where the identity
of the client has been protected. An early case permitting an
attorney to conceal his client's identity is Ex parteMcDonough. 3 °1
In McDonough, an attorney was retained to represent certain
persons during an investigation of election fraud and to defend
three previously indicted individuals. The court held that a grand
jury could not compel the attorney to disclose the identity of his
clients on the ground of attorney-client privilege. The criteria
.301. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1971). But cf. United
States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) and cases following.
302. H. BAITER, TAX FRAUD AND EVASION 5-18 (3rd ed. 1963).
303. See Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service
Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67, 70 (1969); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
1960); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
Cf. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973).
304. 8 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2313 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); United States v.
Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973).
305. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2313 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §90 (2nd ed. 1972); Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax
Investigations, 19 TAX L. REV. 405, 412 (1965).
306. 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915).
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used to evaluate the communication were that the communication of the client's identity did not involve the furtherance of a
criminal act, that the identity was clearly intended to be confidential, and that the clients were not parties to litigation.",
The leading case on the identity issue with respect to Internal Revenue Service investigations is Baird v. Koerner."' This
case involved a payment to the Service of back taxes by an attorney who had been hired by the client's attorney."' In striking a
balance between the common law attorney-client privilege and
the policy of full disclosure in tax investigations, the court noted
that there was no current investigation, that there probably
would be none, and that no litigation existed. Furthermore, the
court found factually that the client intended his identity to be
confidential. Thus, the court held: 10
[A]n attorney cannot be compelled to state the names of
clients who employed him to voluntarily mail sums of money to
the government in payment of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that
client's income tax pending.
This conclusion appears entirely correct on the facts." ' In the
course of an investigation, the identity of the subject of the investigation is known, and the investigator seeks incriminating evidence to convict him. The attorney-client privilege encourages
free communication between the attorney and his client without
fear that the attorney will be compelled to disclose incriminating
evidence. In Baird, the government was aware of illegal activity
but ignorant of who perpetrated the activity. In such a situation,
the client's identity must be preserved so that he will be willing
12
to seek effective legal counsel.
B. Protectionof the Employment Arrangement
During the course of income tax investigations, certain facts
concerning the client's professional relationship with his attorney
307. Id. at 236-37, 149 P. at 568.
308. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).

309. Id. at 627. It is noteworthy that the court relied upon state law in finding that
the client's identity was a privileged communication.
310. Id. at 635.
311. See Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in FederalTax Investigations, 19 TAx
L. Rxv. 405, 412 (1964); Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in InternalRevenue Service
Investigations, 54 MINN. L. Rav. 67, 83 (1969).
312. See Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); Schulze v. Rayunec, 350
F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1965).
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may become a point of controversy. On occasion, the Service has
sought to compel testimony of these facts from the taxpayer's
attorney.
A case dealing directly with the parameters of the attorneyclient privilege in a tax investigation, Colton v. United States,313
held: "[l]t was proper to require counsel to answer questions
services
concerning the years during which they performed legal
'

and the general nature of the services [performed] .

314

In Colton, an attorney was required to answer questions
about the general nature of legal services rendered to the taxpayer
as well as the amounts and dates of fees paid by the client.31 5 The
court recognized that while the giving of tax advice and preparation of tax returns are well within the parameters of legal services,
the attorney-client privilege is limited to matters of substance
communicated to the attorney in professional confidence.31 6 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that there may be circumstances where matters not normally protected by the attorney-client
relationship would constitute prejudicial disclosure and be protected as such. 31 7 The court, however, did not make clear what
those circumstances would be. 318 The court did, however, stop
short of requiring disclosure of confidential papers "specifically
prepared by the client for the purpose of consultation with his
attorney . . . and . . . any of the forms, memoranda and worksheets 'to the extent of any unpublished expression made by an
attorney therein of confidences which had passed between him

and his clients.'

",319

The Service's attempt to obtain answers to such questions is
indicative of the circumstances which have resulted in a partial
vacatur of the attorney-client privilege. With respect to the question of when the attorney's services had been rendered, the Service alleged and the Colton court found that this was a proper
question although it might aid the Service in obtaining further
313. 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962).
314. Id. at 634.
315. See also United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); In re
Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1961).
316. 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2nd Cir. 1962).
317. Id.
318. The court referred to Biard v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) and In re
Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960) which are both void of
criteria.
319. 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2nd Cir. 1962) (citing the judge below). See text accompanying notes 340-71 infra relating to the pre-existing documents rule.
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unprivileged information from the attorney. Similarly, the issue
of what services were performed bore on the question of legal as
opposed to non-legal services, the former being privileged and the
latter not. Furthermore, the nature of the papers held by the
attorney is helpful information for the Service to determine which
documents, if any, might aid in the investigation.3 2
Recently, however, a small incursion has been made into the
heretofore sacrosanct Colton line of cases, which, as previously
indicated, has diminished the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege in income tax fraud cases. In United States v.
Hodgson,311 a special agent issued an administrative summons to
the taxpayer's attorney requiring the production of the attorney's
records of fees paid by or for the taxpayer. The court, after finding
that the sole purpose of the investigation was to obtain evidence
for possible criminal prosecution, held that the information
sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege:"22
The Court finds that the records sought by the summons, and
the information contained therein, are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The assertion of privilege in the instant litigation is proper in view of the fact that the charges for
legal fees were made as communications and the work product
of the attorney and explain the specific and general nature of the
services performed. Disclosure of the requested records could
expose the general nature of the legal services rendered by the
Respondent to [the taxpayer].
It can probably be argued that the use of the Donaldson
"criminal prosecution" test is inappropriate for determining
whether or not documents are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Nevertheless, the Hodgson court's reasoning concerning
the importance of the preservation of the attorney-client privilege
is worth noting, primarily because of the apparent general failure
of most courts to appreciate the attorney-client privilege's fundamental rationale which District Judge Barrow so eloquently re3
cites: 2
The legal profession is a noble one. This Court is aware that
holding inviolate the confidences and secrets communicated by
320. 306 F.2d 633, 638. See text accompanying notes 402-27 infra regarding custodial
care of documents.
321. 73-1 USTC 9419, 81001 (M.D. Okla. 1973).
322. Id.
323. Id.
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a client to an attorney not only facilitates the full development
of facts essential to proper representation of the client, but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal representation. Consequently, the attorney-client privilege should be safeguarded. If
this privilege is not protected, where shall one go for advice?
It is difficult to argue that disclosures such as a client's identity, the nature of the work performed and the time of performance
are privileged absent special circumstances. This is especially
true in light of the wide approval of Judge Wyzinski's formulation
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.324 It is certainly
logical that the relationship must be established prior to a claim
of attorney-client privilege.3 2 The facts elicited by the Service in
Colton certainly aid in proving the attorney-client relationship as
well as proving the confidentiality of the communication.2 6
However, there are certainly circumstances, such as those in
Hodgson, where the admission of certain facts to prove the
attorney-client relationship or the confidentiality of the communication or type of service performed could be elements of proof
of a crime. For example, where a taxpayer is being investigated
for income tax fraud because he is believed to have significantly
understated his income, the date of his initial consultation with
an attorney might give rise to an inference that there had been
reported his income
advice that the taxpayer had not properly
3 21
privileged.
be
should
date
that
thus,
and,
Perhaps a good rule to govern special circumstances would
be one that gave the taxpayer and his attorney a presumption
that the attorney-client privilege is applicable, thereby placing
the burden of proof on the party alleging the nonexistence of the
privilege. Certainly, once the attorney-client relationship is established, the question of what is privileged communication
324. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950):
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services
or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b)
not waived by the client.
325. See Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D. Mass. 1958).
326. 306 F.2d 633, 636-37 (2nd Cir. 1962); see also United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F.
Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); United States v. Ladner, 238 F. Supp. 895 (D. Miss. 1965).
327. See Ritholz, The Commissioner'sInqu'. itorialPowers, 45 TAXEs 782, 788 (1967).
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should bear a close relationship to the purpose for which the
communication was made and the potential damage the information could impart if disclosed. Even if the communication were
made pursuant to an ancillary or peripheral matter, it should be
barred from disclosure, absent conscious waiver, on the ground
that the prejudicial damage of the communication outweighs the
reason for its initial disclosure. It is clear that during the course
of an attorney's inquiry into his client's financial affairs pursuant
to income tax return preparation or income tax fraud investigation many peripheral or ancillary issues are explored. Protection
of these matters is crucial to a client's production of information
to his attorney as well as the attorney's ability to correctly advise
his client. For the courts to deny the attorney-client privilege to
matters which might be prejudicial to a client's cause is to erode
significantly the foundation of the attorney-client privilege.
C. The Taxpayer's Records in the Hands of his Attorney
There is little doubt that a taxpayer's personal records in his
own hands fall within the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination.3 2 The Couch329 case dealt with a taxpayer who had
surrendered possession of her personal records to an accountant.
The Court held that there is no compulsory self-incrimination
where "there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and so
[no] semblance of governmental compulsion against the person
of the accused". 330 The rationale for this decision was that "where
personal rights interfere with the interests of society in the enforcement of laws, and collection of revenues", personal liberty
must give way to superior interests.3 31 It is with the heavy impact
of the Couch decision on the issue of what is "personal compulsion" in income tax fraud investigations that the exploration of
the taxpayer's records in the hands of an attorney must begin.
1.

PrivilegedRecords

In the hands of the taxpayer all personal records, including
but not limited to account books, bank statements, checks and
receipts, are protected by the privilege against compulsory self328. United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Runte, 73-1 USTC
9265 (W.D. La. 1973); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969).
329. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
330. Id. at 336.
331. Id. See generally text accompanying notes 454-81 infra on accountant-client
privilege.
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incrimination in a criminal tax fraud investigation.132 The courts
have consistently held this fifth amendment privilege to be personal in nature and, therefore, generally it must be raised by the
party claiming the interest. A "legally protectable" interest is a
prerequisite to raising the constitutional claim. 33
The major issue, remaining after Couch, with respect to an
attorney's possession of a taxpayer's personal records or workpapers is whether or not the taxpayer will be considered to be in
constructive possession of the documents where the attorney has
been given the documents as an aid in giving legal advice to the
client, whether for preparation of the taxpayer's income tax return or for defending him in an income tax fraud investigation.
Prior to Couch, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
33 4 held that an attorney retained
Judson
by a taxpayer under
investigation by the Internal Revenue Service had standing to
assert the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination where the taxpayer had given possession of certain potentially incriminating documents to the attorney at the attorney's
request. The rationale for this determination was that the personal privilege should be respected where the client himself could
335
have raised it.
In Couch, the taxpayer attempted to rely on Boyd v. United
States336 for the proposition that "any forcible and compulsory
extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of a crime" violates the fourth
and fifth amendments."' The Couch Court distinguished Boyd
and Judson because they involved "instances where possession
and ownership conjoined". 31 Apparently, the Supreme Court, by
citing Judson as a case where possession and ownership are conjoined, has, by inference, accepted the proposition that an attor332. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517 (1971); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); McAlistor v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 90 (1905); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892).
333. 409 U.S. 322, 333-34 (1973); But cf. Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1963).
334. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). See also notes 228-48 supra.
335. Id. at 467. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2307 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
336. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See generally text accompanying notes 50-94.
337. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973).
338. Id. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) for a case where if
ownership and possession are considered conjoined, it could only be through the concept
of constructive possession.
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ney as the taxpayer's representative may not be forced to produce
his client's documents because the client will at least be considered to be in constructive possession. 3 9
2.

Previously PreparedDocuments

The pre-existing documents rule has been litigated often.
Under this doctrine, the courts have held that the attorney-client
privilege may not be asserted to protect documents in the hands
of an attorney where the documents were created prior to the
attorney-client relationship.324 The rationale for such a decision
rests on the fear that if documents can be withheld, as can oral
communication, 341 a client could impede discovery of his own documents and records by the simple transfer of the documents to
his attorney.
If, as Couch indicates, an attorney in possession of his
client's documents and records can assert his client's fifth amendment privilege or the client himself can intervene and assert his
own privilege against compulsory self-incrimination on the theory
of constructive possession, the exception to the attorney-client
privilege for pre-existing documents would appear meaningless.
2
The cases, however, offer no clear answer.3 4
An early case accepting the proposition that an attorney can
assert his client's fifth amendment protection against disclosure
of documents is Application of House. 343 In that case, the taxpayers instructed their accountant to turn over his previously prepared work papers partly to their attorney and partly to them339. The court by making the exception for attorneys and not accountants ignores
reality but not the constitution. The sixth amendment guarantees right to counsel.
340. See generally, 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2307 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961);
United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1973); Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966).
341. 8 J. WCMORE, EVIDENCE §2308 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See, e.g., United
States v. Rosenstein, 73-1 USTC 9213 (2nd Cir. 1973); United States v. Bouschor, 316
F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962); United
States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Groh v. Decker, 72-1 USTC 119410
(W.D. Mich. 1971). Cf. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Hodgson 73-1 USTC 9419 (N.D. Okla. 1973); United States v. Davis, 72-1
USTC 9339 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb.
1970).
342. See United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, rehearingdenied, 73-2 USTC 9802
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
976 (1964); United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971); United States
v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Conti, 300 F. Supp. 73
(D. Del. 1969). Cf. Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
923 (1957).
343. 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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selves. While the court found the taxpayers' allegation of the
attorney-client privilege "so clearly unfounded that it is astonishan
ing",344 it held, in denying enforcement of the summons, that
34 5
attorney can invoke his client's fifth amendment privilege:
The government apparently seeks to establish a novel rule that
unless the client himself participates in hearings. . .held before
the agent of the Internal Revenue Bureau, he waives his Constitutional rights. The government could thus put any taxpayer to
the choice of attending hearings or investigations

. . .

or waiv-

ing his privilege against self-incrimination. Such a rule would
accomplish nothing except to impose a heavy penalty

. . .

on

those taxpayers who chose to assert their right against selfincrimination . . . The effective exercise of Constitutional

rights should not be abridged by any such technical and onerous
requirements as that.
The Ninth Circuit in the case of United States v. Judson,.6
after declining to quash a section 7602 summons on the basis of
attorney-client privilege, held that an attorney in possession of
his client's pre-existing records could raise the client's fifth
amendment privilege if the client in possession of the documents
could raise the same privilege:4 7
An attorney is his client's advocate. His function is to raise all
the just and meritorious defenses his client has. No other "third
party", nor "agent", nor "representative" stands in such a
unique relationship between the accused and the judicial process as does his attorney. He is the only person besides the client
himself who is permitted to prepare and conduct the defense of
the matter under investigation. The attorney and his client are
so identical with respect to the function of the evidence and to
the proceedings which call for its production that any distinction is mere sophistry.
Cases expressing views contrary to those stated in Application of House and Judson rely on the rationale that there can
be no constitutional privilege for incriminating documents concerning a taxpayer when the documents are in the possession of
another person. 48 Those cases generally cite Hale v. Henkel,349
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
States v.

Id. at 97.
Id. at 100.
322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 466. For various analyses of similar propositions, see generally, United
Hickok, 481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454
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McAlister v. Henkel,3 0 United States v. White,35 Wilson v.
5 4 for
United States, 32 Boyd v. United States" and In re Fahey"
the proposition that the fifth amendment privilege is personal
and therefore can only be raised by the party seeking its protection. These cases, with the exception of In re Fahey, can be distinguished on the ground that they dealt with the difference between

natural persons and entities. It is clear that the former have a
fifth amendment privilege where the latter do not." This is true
even where the corporate records in question are in the hands of
an individual whom they incriminate. 56 In none of the entity

cases is there a clear holding that an attorney cannot raise a
natural person's constitutional privilege. To the contrary, the
Supreme Court in Grantv. United States35 apparently intimated
that an attorney could refuse to produce his client's personal
records if the client had a constitutional right to do so:"'
The inquiry thus remains whether in these circumstances Grant
[the attorney] could refuse their production if.they would tend
to incriminate his principals ...
They remained subject to inspection and examination when
(6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Herbert, 72-2 USTC 9639
(D. Utah 1972) rehearingdenied, 73-1 USTC 9383 (D. Utah 1973); United States v. Doe,
72-1 USTC 9300 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048 (D.
Md. 1971); Groh v. Decker, 72-1 USTO 9410 (W.D. Mich. 1971); United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970); United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y.
1969); United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
349. 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
350. 201 U.S. 90 (1905).
351. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
352. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
353. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
354. 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).
355. It is clear that corporations have no fifth amendment privilege. Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). This doctrine has been extended to trustees in bankruptcy,
Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913) and to papers of an unincorporated labor union,
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). The White decision indicated that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to papers belonging to a group. Since
the privilege is personal, it applies only to natural persons. Accord, United States v.
Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1971).
356. See United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1971); Groh v. Decker, 72-1 USTC 9410 (W.D. Mich. 1971); United States v. Lyons, 442
F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971). See United States v. Gray 73-1 USTO 9373 (E.D. Ill. 1973);
United States v. Kessler, 338 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Ohio 1972); United States v. Herbert,
72-2 USTO 9638 (D. Utah 1972).
357. 227 U.S. 74 (1912).
358. Id. at 79-80. See also, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1963).
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required by competent authority, and they could not have been
withheld by Burlingame himself upon the ground that they
would tend to incriminate him. [Emphasis added]

In re Fahey and cases following it generally dealt with records
owned by a third party (usually an accountant) and in the hands
of the taxpayer or his attorney.35 A pre-Couch district court decision, United States v. Fisher,6 ' discussed in depth the difference
between ownership and possession of previously prepared documents in the hands of a taxpayer's attorney. In Fisher, the taxpayer's accountant gave the taxpayer all of the records in the
accountant's possession. The taxpayer promptly turned the documents over to his attorney. The special agent assigned to the case
served Mr. Fisher, the taxpayer's attorney, with a section 7602
summons for the documents. In the district court enforcement
proceeding, Fisher attempted to assert the taxpayer's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the theory
that rightful and indefinite possession of the papers was a proper
test for the determination of the taxpayer's fifth amendment
claim."' The court, relying on a Third Circuit decision, United
States v. Egenberg,3 12 held that where a third party has a superior
right to possession of the papers, a witness cannot withhold them.
33
A post-Couch Fifth Circuit case, United States v. White,
again dealt with the problem raised where the work papers of a
359. 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961). See also United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757,
rehearingdenied, 73-2 USTC 9802 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp.
420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1973); Remmer v. United States, 250
F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953).
360. 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
361. But cf. United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States
v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
362. 443 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1971).
363. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973). In discussing the Donaldsonproper-purpose test
Judge Ainsworth, in dissent stated:
There is strong reason to believe that the government was not acting in good
faith when it served the instant summons. The case bad initially been investigated for some time by an Internal Revenue agent and the Special Agent of the
Intelligence Division was called in later. Even though a recommendation for
prosecution had not been made at the time the summons issued, the Service had
sufficient information available upon which to base a recommendation. The
recommendation should not have been delayed to take advantage of a civil
summons. I doubt, therefore, that the requisites of Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971), have been complied with since the evidence points
most strongly to an absence of good faith on the part of the Government. . ..
Id. at 765.
See also Judge Ainsworth's dissent to the en banc denial of rehearing at 73-2 USTC 9802.
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client's accountant are in the hands of the client's attorney. The
attorney in White had been summoned to produce the documents
pursuant to a section 7602 summons, and he refused. One of the
grounds he asserted was the attorney-client privilege, which was
summarily denied. Another was his client's fifth amendment
privilege. In ordering enforcement of the summons, the court
stated:' 4
The lesson to be learned from Couch, then is that unless the
taxpayer is actually in possession of documents sought by the
government or clearly in constructive possession he will be unable to seek the shelter of the Fifth Amendment because he will
not be the object of any impermissible governmental compulsion. [empliasis added]
The White court relied on the rule that an attorney cannot
raise his client's fifth amendment privilege unless the client has
one which he could have raised himself. This rule was applied on
the theory that the taxpayer had no fifth amendment privilege
because he had never owned or possessed the documents prior to
their coming into the attorney's hands.365 Citing Couch for the
proposition that constructive possession might be sufficient
grounds for an attorney to invoke his client's constitutional guarantees, the court asserted the requirement that the taxpayer himself must place the papers in the hands of another person, thereby
retaining the right to immediate possession without having actual
possession. This prerequisite was found lacking in White:36
[Tihis conception of constructive possession cannot be extended to fit the situation in which White's clients find themselves. For it is undisputed that they have never for an instant
been in possession of the papers sought by the government
... . [T]he necessary ingredient of personal compulsion
against White's clients is totally lacking, and in its absence the
fifth amendment does not prohibit the government from obtain364. 477 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1973).
365. After Couch, this result leads to the ridiculous conclusion that when an accoun-

tant transfers workpapers or the taxpayer's records directly to the taxpayer's attorney, the
attorney could not raise the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination because the taxpayer did not own or possess the documents prior to their
coming into the attorney's hands. If however, the accountant first transfers the papers to
the taxpayer who subsequently turns them over to the attorney, the attorney could then
raise the taxpayer's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. It is indeed tenuous
to permit a constitutionally guaranteed privilege to be balanced on such a precarious
pinnacle.
366. 477 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ing information vital to the enforcement of its laws and the
collection of its revenues.
It appears obvious that where an attorney is in possession of
documents incriminating his client which were not prepared in
furtherance of the attorney-client relationship but rather are foreign to that relationship, there can be no attorney-client privilege
with respect to those documents without a fundamental change
in the doctrine.36 7 It is, however, equally obvious that an attorney
who is aiding a client being investigated for criminal tax fraud
has a right, if not an inherent obligation, to employ every legal
method available to protect his client's guaranteed rights. To
deny the attorney the right to assert the fifth amendment privilege on behalf of his client is to deny in part the client's right 6to
8
adequate representation guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
When documents would be protected by the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in the hands of a taxpayer, it is
unjust for the taxpayer to lose that protection simply because the
documents are transferred into the hands of the client's attorney.
A legal distinction based upon ownership and possession of documents seems unfounded. The constitutional privilege against selfincrimination ought to run from the taxpayer to his property
irrespective of who might have temporary possession. This is especially true when the documents are in the possession of an
attorney retained primarily to safeguard his client's rights in a
federal income tax investigation. Regarding the incriminating effect, it makes no difference whether the documents are in the
hands of the taxpayer or in the hands of his attorney.
367. See generally the discussion on pre-existing documents in the text accompanying note 340 supra. Note also that records prepared by an attorney while acting as a
business advisor or in a "non-legal" capacity are not privileged. See also text accompanying notes 482-508 infra.
The sixth amendment guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to
counsel for his defense. The Supreme Court in recent years has extended constitutional
guarantees to a person being investigated. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) protecting the right to privacy by invoking the exclusionary rule where illegal searches and
seizures produced incriminating evidence. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the
Supreme Court required that a prospective defendant be advised of his constitutional
rights prior to being questioned. If an attorney is denied the right to assert his client's fifth
amendment privileges because the attorney is in possession of potentially incriminating
evidence, then the attorney may be neutralized in his effort to protect his client. This idea
of opening the attorney's files to the government to aid them in procuring evidence of
criminal activity is then an invasion of the right to counsel.
368. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). See also the dissent in United States v. White, 477
F.2d 757, 767 (5th Cir. 1973); see especially Judge Ainsworth's dissent to the en banc
denial of rehearing at 73-2 USTC 9802.
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Similarly, if the court in Judson369 is correct, constitutional
guarantees should run to the taxpayer even if the documents are
directly procured by the taxpayer's attorney from a third party.
The attorney is the legal representative of the taxpayer. His actions on behalf of the taxpayer are, in legal effect, the taxpayer's
own actions. The sacrosanct nature of revenue collection notwithstanding, there should be no legal distinction regarding a taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege where documents in his attorney's possession are obtained from the client himself or from a
third party.
The attorney-client relationship is a personal one, guaranteed by the sixth amendment right to counsel, by the attorneyclient privilege, and by ethical restraints on the attorney. 1° It is
obvious that the attorney-client relationship does not turn on
whether the attorney or client has possession of potentially incriminating documents. It follows, therefore, as Dean Wigmore
371
has stated:

[Tihat when the client himself would be privileged from the
production of the documents, either as a party at common law
or as a third person claiming title or as exempt from selfincrimination, the attorney having possession of the document
3
is not bound to produce. 1'
3.

ConfidentialInformation

It will be recalled that information communicated by a client
to his attorney must be clothed in "confidentiality" before the
communication will be within the ever narrowing parameters of
the attorney-client privilege. The key to the confidential nature
of communication between the attorney and his client is the
37 2
client's desire for secrecy.
An issue of growing importance in federal income tax fraud
cases is whether information communicated by a client to his
attorney for purposes of preparing federal income tax returns is
confidential. An early case dealing directly with the issue of
369. Note that attorneys are bound by a strict ethical code that precludes the sharing
of information given to the attorney by the client. Accountants have no such restraints.
See United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) and United States v. White, 477 F.2d
757 (5th Cir. 1973).
370. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2307 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also Mr.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 344 (1973).
371. 8 J. WICMORE, EVIDENCE §2311 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
372. 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962).
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whether information communicated to an attorney by his client
for purposes of preparing a federal income tax return is confidential is United States v. Colton.3 3 Recall, that Colton dealt with a
taxpayer's attorney who had been summoned to produce "retained copies of income tax returns, workpapers, correspondence
files, memoranda and all other data relating to the preparation
37 4
and the filing of Federal Income Tax Returns" for his client.
75
With respect to confidentiality, the court stated:
Not all communications between an attorney and his client
are privileged. Particularly in the case of an attorney preparing
a tax return ... a good deal of information transmitted to an
attorney by a client is not intended to be confidential, but rather
is given for transmittal by the attorney to others- for example,
for inclusion in the tax return. Such information is, of course,
not privileged.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cote 7 confronted the
problem of whether workpapers prepared by an accountant at the
request of the taxpayer's attorney fell within the confidentiality
requirement of the attorney-client privilege. After determining
that the attorney-client privilege applied to workpapers prepared
by an accountant at the request of the taxpayer's attorney, the
37
court found that:
Notwithstanding our recognition that the attorney-client privilege attached to the information contained in the accountant's
workpapers under the circumstances existing here, we find that
by filing the amended returns the taxpayers communicated, at
least in part, the substance of that information to the government, and they must now disclose the detail underlying the
reported data. A client may waive the privilege which protects
what he earlier confided to his attorney or his attorney to him.
The notion that the filing of an income tax return eliminates
any confidentiality with respect to its underlying information is
reinforced in Couch v. United States.38 In Couch, a taxpayer
attempted to quash a section 7602 summons for her own documents, which were in the possession of her accountant. Mrs.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 634.
Id. at 638.
456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 144.
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Id. at 329. See also concurring opinion at 337.
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Couch contended that her expectation of privacy protected her
from the production of potentially incriminating materials which
were her personal property. The majority concluded the contents
of her personal records would not be disclosed. 3 9
The criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity remains not the
ownership of property but the "physical or moral compulsion
exerted." [Citations omitted] We hold today that no Fourth or
Fifth Amendment claim can prevail where, as in this case, there
exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of
governmental compulsion against the person of the accused. It
is important, in applying constitutional principles, to interpret
them in light of the fundamental interests of personal liberty
they were meant to serve. Respect for these principles is eroded
when they leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest of society in enforcement of its laws and collection
of the revenues. 80
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a brilliant dissent, argued that Mrs.
Couch had a constitutionally protected right to expect that the
accountant's agency was for a specific purpose-to complete the
taxpayer's tax return. It is clear, at least to Mr. Justice Douglas,
that the preparation of tax returns by an accountant places fidu31
ciary responsibilities upon the accountant:
One of those responsibilities was not to use the records given
him for any purpose other than completing the returns. Under
these circumstances, it hardly can be said that by giving the
records to the accountant, the petitioner committed them to the
public domain.
Thus far, the offspring of Couch have tended to expand the
"no-confidentiality rule" which requires production of information underlying the preparation of a tax return. The recent case
of United States v. Schmidt"2 is such an example. There, an
accountant retained by the taxpayer's attorney was required to
disclose sources of data underlying information appearing in a tax
379. Id. at 336.
380. Id. at 340. §7206 of the INTERNAL

REVENUE

CODE places preparers in the position

of being guilty of income tax evasion when they have knowledge that the records are
falsified or in some other way intentionally inaccurate. The preparer is also liable to the
taxpayer under common law concepts of fiduciary duty. See also United States v. Wein.
garden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973). But cf. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339
(M.D. Pa. 1973).
381. 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
382. 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
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return. Citing Colton v. United States 83 the court,
after finding
384
the attorney-client privilege applicable, held:
Each [question] attempts to elicit sources of information underlying data appearing on a tax return. These are not confidential. [Citations omitted] Indeed, it is important that the questions be answered because, to the extent that information used
in preparing a return is derived from sources other than the
clients or the clients' agents, the substance of it is not privileged.
The "no-confidentiality rule" which holds that a common
law or constitutional privilege is, in substance, waived when what
would be confidential information is communicated in any form
to a public agency has not yet been fully accepted. For instance,
it has not been suggested that a taxpayer in possession of his
personal records can be compelled to produce those records when
they are used in preparing his own income tax return. Such a
holding, it would seem, requires acceptance of the notion that a
taxpayer waives his constitutional rights against invasion of privacy and compulsory self-incrimination when he files his income
tax return. An alternative theory which would mandate production of the taxpayer's documents underlying an income tax return
is that such records are not testimonial, and therefore, no consti3 5
tutional privilege would attach to the documents. 1
Although there is no holding that requires production by a
taxpayer of materials used to prepare federal income tax returns
in a criminal tax investigation, there are cases relying on two
alternative theories of law which, on occasion, have permitted
discovery of the personal records of individuals. The two theories
are the required records doctrine and the work product doctrine.
The former has never directly been invoked in criminal income
tax fraud cases, but the latter has been frequently employed by
383. 360 F. Supp. 339, 350 (M.D. Pa. 1973). See note 479 infra and text accompanying
for an analysis of the material the court permitted the government access to.
384. A holding that a taxpayer's records are not testimonial would remove the
possession-test and require mandatory production of all information underlying the income tax return. This would be in accord with Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948),
which mandated production of all records required under the Emergency Price Control
Act. See notes 428-53 infra and 191-210 supra and accompanying text. See also, Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa.
1973).
385. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Judson,
322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa.
1973); United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. W. Va. 1966); Bauer v. Orser, 258
F. Supp. 338, 342-43 (D.N.D. 1966).
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the government in joint civil-criminal income tax fraud investigations with some success.3 6
a.

The Required Records Doctrine:

The required records doctrine was initially enunciated in
3
Wilson v. United States: 81
[T]he physical custody of incriminating documents does not
itself protect the custodian against their compulsory production. The question still remains with respect to the nature of the
documents and the capacity in which they are held. It may yet
appear that they are of a character which subjects them to the
scrutiny demanded and that the custodian has voluntarily assumed a duty which overrides his claim of privilege. .

.

. The

principle applies not only to public documents in public offices,
but also to records required by law to be kept in order that there
may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established. There the privilege
which exists as to private papers cannot be maintained.
This doctrine was first applied to corporate cases where no
fifth amendment privileges would attach.3 8 It was later extended
to the papers of private individuals in Shapiro v. United States."'
386. 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
387. For cases denying a fifth amendment privilege to corporate records, see Beard
v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953). For additional cases and discussions see
Edgar, Tax Records, The Fifth Amendment and the "Required Records Doctrine," 9 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 502, 505-10 (1965); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967
Sup. CT. REV. 193, 214-224; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2259(c) (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961); Comment, "Couch v. United States"--Taxpayer's Records and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: The Fifth Amendment Bars to the Government's Bank
Account, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 106, 107-08 (1973).

388. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
389. Id.; But cf. Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1969) where a footnote
quotes the Justice Department brief to the effect that the government has refrained from
making the "required records argument in recent years." Id. at 462 n.2. For an excellent
analysis of the doctrine, see Lipton, Record Keeping and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination,14 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 1331 (1956). The possibility of a resurrection
of Shapiro has increased by the recent use of search warrants in tax cases. If the courts
should hold that the Constitution precludes the involuntary relinquishing of books and
records under a search warrant, the Service could contend that the required records
doctrine denies the taxpayer both the attorney-client privilege as well as his constitutional
safeguards.
Such a result would require the Supreme Court to hold that a taxpayer's records are
not communicative or testimonial. Under a recent decision, the effect of nontestimoniality may have already been achieved, for the court in Couch stated:
[blut there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an
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There, the Supreme Court sanctioned compulsory production of
an individual's private records that were required to be kept by
regulations promulgated under the Price Control Act. 90
b.

The Work Product Doctrine:

The work product doctrine was initially pronounced by the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.391 There, the court explored the extent to which a party may inquire into information
procured by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible civil litigation. After finding the attorney-client
privilege inapplicable the court stated:3 9
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an
attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential
to the preparation of one's case, discovery may be properly had.
[Emphasis added]
The impact of this decision is to protect from discovery documents prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation, absent a showing of necessity. Documents prepared by an attorney
in anticipation of civil litigation would otherwise not be protected
under the liberal discovery rules in both the federal and state
courts. 93 Generally, documents prepared pursuant to a criminal
investigation are protected by constitutional limitations.
or even
Whether the Hickman rule prevails in joint criminal-civil
3 94
criminal tax investigations remains unclear.
An early income tax case dealing with the work product rule
is In re Kearney.39 5 There, a bank sought denial of enforcement
of a section 7602 summons for documents prepared in part by the
bank's attorney pursuant to an investigation of another individual. The individual and his corporation had made loans from the
bank's predecessor in interest. After finding that the attorneyclient privilege was inapplicable, the court directed its attention
to the work-product rule. The court held that where the Service
accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information
therein is required in an income tax return.[Emphasis added]. 409 U.S. at 335.
See also, Edgar, Tax Records, The Fifth Amendment and the "Required Records
Doctrine," 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 502 (1965).
390. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

391. Id. at 511.
392. See generally 8
§§2001 to 2300.

WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL,

393. See United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1973) and cases cited therein.

394. 227 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
395. Id. at 177.
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investigates a third party who is not the person summoned, and
the summoned person has documents in his possession that were
prepared by that person's attorney for possible litigation not involving the government investigation, that the documents are not
protected by the work-product doctrine."' Sub silentio, the court
apparently held that the exception carved out by the Hickman
rule was applicable where the documents in question were prepared by an attorney for a purpose other than a federal tax investigation, and that in a federal tax investigation discovery may be
397
had.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Brown39 held that
the work-product doctrine is applicable to an Internal Revenue
criminal investigation, but that the "strong public interest...
expressed by Congress in enforcement of the Internal Revenue
Act" may be relevant in demonstrating the degree of necessity to
be shown prior to the enforcement of a summons. 99 In Brown, an
accounting firm was ordered to produce, inter alia, a memorandum of law prepared by the taxpayer's attorney which included
legal judgments made by the attorney. Apparently, in the Seventh Circuit, the degree of necessity required to meet the
Hickman criteria is something less than urgent necessity, and the
probability of criminal conviction is not relevant to determining
the necessity for enforcement."'
The confusion surrounding the concept of confidentiality has
become increasingly more complex after Couch and subsequent
cases. Nevertheless, one concept that has been clarified by Couch
and Schmidt is that taxpayers will have increasingly greater difficulty in income tax fraud investigations in attempting to deny
396. Id.
397. 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
398. Id. at 1041.
399. Any judicial inroads into the work product doctrine, in criminal tax fraud
investigations, would call for a square holding that the work product of an attorney in
anticipation of Internal Revenue litigation with respect to his client's criminal tax liability
is either not testimonial in the constitutional sense or that public policy demands production. Such a determination would rest upon very tenuous constitutional ground. To sug-

gest that an attorney's work product in a criminal tax investigation is not testimonial is
equivalent to demanding production of an attorney's notes of his client's confession in a

murder case on the ground that the notes are not testimonial or that the government could
not otherwise obtain discovery. Likewise, what greater public policy prevails in criminal
tax fraud cases than in murder cases which would permit discovery of testimonial documents in the former case and not in the latter. Clearly, there is none.
400. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
White, 477 F.2d 757, rehearing denied, 73-2 USTC 9802 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973).
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government discovery of their personal records held by third parties.40 '
It has always been clear that the government can inspect any
of the taxpayer's personal records in a pure civil investigation
where there is little possibility of criminal prosecution, whatever
the situs and whoever has possession of the documents. Now, a
taxpayer has no expectation of confidentiality where his accountant retained by the taxpayer's attorney has in his possession
work papers or photocopies of the taxpayer's records used directly
in preparing the income tax returns. If Couch is correct, and
unless the taxpayer is considered to have "constructive possession" of his personal records or accountant's workpapers when
they are in the hands of his attorney, the taxpayer may have no
expectation of privacy. If, as previously indicated, Couch is interpreted as removing all expectation of privacy where personal records are disclosed in any form in a federal tax return, it would
be tantamount to a waiver of constitutional as well as common
law privileges and the documents would be at the government's
disposal. This is particularly true when the documents are in the
possession of the taxpayer's attorney. These results are ominous
threats to the personal sanctity of privacy guaranteed by the
constitution.
4.

Custodial Care of Records

In view of the discussion thus far, it is not surprising that preexisting documents received by an attorney, even for purposes of
consultation, are not confidential communications and therefore
not within the confines of the attorney-client privilege.40 2 The
rationale is that the administration of justice could be easily defeated by transferring from one to the other important papers and
thereby prevent a court or administrative agency from compelling
the production of documents." 3
In addition to this rule, it appears that constitutional privi401. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1953). Note, although no
attorney-client privilege is available, the attorney may be able to raise his client's fifth
amendment claim. See notes 228-48 supra. See generally, 8 J. WIMORE, EVIDENCE § §22902329 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
402. See United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Weingarden, 374 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
403. This is true for the accountant custodian but perhaps not the attorney custodian. See United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Moore, 73-2
USTC 9748 (5th Cir. 1973) and United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa.
1973).
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leges may be waived by turning over valuable documents to a
third party for custodial care or preparation of returns.' 4
As might be expected from the previous discussion, the
courts have been ingenious in preventing ownership from inhibiting discovery. Recall that in Couch v. United States"'5 the Service
successfully sought the production of the taxpayer's tax records,
which had been held in the hands of her accountant for a number
of years. The issue squarely before the Court was whether the
taxpayer could invoke her fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination to prevent the production of her
40 6
business records.
After reciting the importance of preserving the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court stated :407
It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege
is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to
information which may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes
put it: "A party is privileged from producing the evidence but
not from its production." Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S.
457, 458 (1913) ....
In the case before us the ingredient of personal compulsion
against an accused is lacking. The summons and order. . .are
directed against the accountant. He, not the taxpayer, is the
only one compelled to do anything.
Mrs. Couch attempted to rely on the line of cases beginning
with Boyd v. United States4" and culminating in United States
v. Judson,40 9 where it was consistently held that any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a person's testimony or private papers to
be used against him as evidence of a crime violated both the
fourth and fifth amendments. The Court distinguished the facts
in Couch on the basis of the divergence of ownership and possession:

410

[P]ossession bears the closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privilege
against self incrimination to a concept of ownership would be to
draw a meaningless line. . . . Such a holding would thus place
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 328-29.
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). See text accompanying notes 184-190 supra.
409 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 337.
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unnecessary emphasis on the form of communication. . . while
diverting the inquiry from the basic purpose of the Fifth Amendment's protections.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, takes the
view that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is
available to one who turns over his personal records to a third
person for "custodial safekeeping" rather than "disclosure of the
not as succinct in their obfuscainformation." 4 1' The majority is
412
rule":
line
tion of the "bright
We hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can
prevail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion
against the person of the accused.
The decision in Couch puts great emphasis on two theories
with respect to confidentiality. The first is that the very act of
"communicating" documents to a second party, who in turn communicates the same in summary form to a governmental agency,
in some way waives the right to privacy where the documents
remain in the hands of the second party. The second theory running through Couch is that the very act of surrendering long term
possession of documents to another person can destroy the testimonial nature of the documents.
It is somewhat incomprehensible that constitutional rights
can be waived by failing to require prompt return of documents
after employing an accountant or perhaps an attorney to prepare
income tax returns, which, by necessity, require certain documentary information to complete.4 13 First, even if the documents
in question could prove an understatement of taxes, the documents themselves are not within the sphere of evidence traditionally subject to discovery in a criminal investigation. 414 Evidence
such as a note outlining the procedure of the criminal act from
one co-conspirator to another has been traditionally considered as
an instrumentality of a crime.4"' An argument that business re411. Id. at 336 (Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring).
412. For other cases considering requirements for waiver, see Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1966).
413. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694 (1944); United States v. Maciel, 351 F. Supp. 817 (D.R.I. 1972); cf. United States
v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
414. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
415. See Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 31 AFTR 2d 73-1075 (9th Cir. 1973) and Hill v.
Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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cords of a taxpayer are such instrumentalities of crime is untenable, for such records are not prepared in contemplation of a crime
but in contemplation of keeping accurate personal records of various transactions. 16 There may be instances where a double set
of books are prepared, one for accuracy and the other for evading
taxes. The second set would be an instrumentality of tax evasion
and therefore a proper subject for discovery because the very
preparation of the second set is for the purpose of carrying out a
premeditated criminal act. 17 This is not the case where only one
set of books is kept.
Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent to Couch states:41 8
A transfer to a lawyer is protected, not simply because there is
a recognized attorney-client privilege, but also because the ordinary expectation is that the lawyer will not further publicize
what he has-been given.
There is, however, little doubt that an attorney does not
overreach his capabilities when he gives a client tax advice for
purposes of preparing the client's income tax return. 9 If the long
term possession of a taxpayer's records by an accountant constitutes waiver of the fourth and fifth amendment right of privacy
after they have been disclosed in summary fashion by the accountant, then it is difficult to justify the opposite result if an attorney
is the discloser of the information. It would be far better to permit a limited accountant-client privilege with respect to income
tax matters. The Tax Court Rules of Practice permit accountants
to "represent others in the preparation and trial" of civil court
cases. 10 Tax accountants are required to have an intimate knowledge of tax law and are professional experts in tax law. Disclosure
to a tax accountant, privileged or not, is tantamount to disclosure
21
to an attorney.
416. See Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)
and United States v. Scher 73-1 USTC 9315 (7th Cir. 1973).
417. 409 U.S. at 350.
418. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962).
419. Rule 2, TAX COURT RULES OF PRACTICE; cf. United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d
297 (9th Cir. 1973). See dissent, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 at 351.
420. See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918) which held the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination unavailable to a party seeking to suppress
admission of incriminating documents before a grand jury. See also Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921) permitting the government to use stolen documents against an accused
in a criminal trial.
421. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
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It is unbelievable that disclosure to the attorney should be
privileged and identical disclosure to an equally competent accountant not be privileged for there is no logical basis for such a
distinction. It has been held that an attorney can raise his client's
fifth amendment rights while an accountant cannot.4 22 Disclosure

to an attorney therefore is not a constitutional waiver of the fifth
amendment privilege, but disclosure to an equally competent tax
accountant is. Both should be privileged in that disclosure or
possession of the taxpayer's records should not interfere with the
owner's right to privacy or privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.4 23 This is especially true where the purpose of the

transfer is considered, for it is inequitable to hold that a taxpayer
who wishes to be certain of proper preparation of his returns and
therefore seeks professional guidance in some way surrenders his
right to privacy and his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.
It is also difficult to understand a construction of the fourth
and fifth amendments which permits a distinction based upon
ownership and possession of documents. There is no doubt that
the privilege is personal. "Personal" has generally been construed
in fifth amendment cases as running to the holder of the privilege.4 24 Prior to Couch, the privilege against compulsory self-

incrimination has, with a great degree of regularity, run to the
owner of the documents.41 Although a person who has seen another's records can be compelled to testify as to their contents,
the holder of the documents is not compelled to produce them in
a criminal investigation of which he is the object. There well may
be situations where the owner of personal papers may so relinquish possession that it is tantamount to forfeiting ownership,
but consulting a tax accountant for the purpose of preparing complicated compulsory tax returns is not such case. 26 The owner

422. See generally text accompanying notes 457-64 infra on the use of accountant's
workpapers in income tax fraud investigation.
423. See Johnson v. United States, .228 U.S. 457 (1913) where the Court held that the

books and records of a bankrupt transferred to a trustee in bankruptcy could be used as
evidence against the bankrupt in a prosecution for concealing money from the trustee.
Both title and possession, however, had been transferred to the trustee in bankruptcy by
operation of law. Therefore, there was no personal compulsion as contemplated by the fifth
amendment.
424. But see United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
425. See Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service
Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1969).
426. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §124 (2nd ed. 1972); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966).
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should at least bear a presumption of constructive possession
which the government must overcome. It is even more preferable
to deny any disclosure by the professional advisor or preparer
because the disclosure in summary form on a tax return in no way
discloses the basic transactions included in the summary which
are all that the law requires. The taxpayer would rightly expect
the professional to keep such transactions secret and confidential.
Therefore, the constitutional aberration could be eliminated by
affording the accountant an accountant-client privilege and forbidding disclosure based in income tax cases upon the privilege,
thus avoiding the constitutional issue.2 7
5. Are Tax Records Testimonial?
What documents can be the subject of compulsory discovery
by the government in a criminal income tax fraud investigation
has, in light of recent decisions, turned on the fifth amendment
right against compulsory self-incrimination 248 Based on the rationale underlying the privilege, it is arguable that the privilege
ought to protect the taxpayer from any compelled cooperation
with the Intelligence Division. Insofar as the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination rests upon peculiarities of the
human psyche, it would be consistent to hold that the privilege
protects against any invasion of the psyche. The Supreme Court,
however, has stated clearly that the scope of the privilege is not
synonymous with the complex values it helps protect."' As early
as 1910, the Court held that the fifth amendment was not violated
when a suspect was compelled to put on a blouse to determine
whether it fitted him. "[The prohibition", declared the Court,
". .. is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from him. .. "430 Even if the delineation of what falls within the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination is based upon communication, the scope of the
privilege in income tax fraud investigations is still unclear.
There are three judicially plausible criteria that may be used
in determining whether documents fall within the ever tightening
circle of constitutional immunity. First, Dean Wigmore suggested
427. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
428. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See text accompanying notes 191.
210 supra.
429. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
430. 8 J. WICMORE, EVIDENCE §2263 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also the
plurality opinion in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971), joined in by four justices,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/7

36

et al.: Part III: Student Comment: The Attorney-Client Privilege

Tax Symposium-Part III
that the term "communicative" might be limited to words spoken
by the accused. 31 Second, communication can easily include all
activities performed for the purpose of communication. Within
this test could be included the preparation of books and records
for the purpose of "communicating", in summary form, information required on income tax returns as well as the surrender of
physical possession to a qualified expert to aid in the preparation
of these returns and retention for possible future investigations.
Finally, and most desirable, would be a test which would include
any written documents, which if used to prove guilt, would require reliance by the government upon the taxpayer's representations. 3- This formulation would of necessity include all of the
taxpayer's documentation, oral or otherwise, which the government might use to prove the matters asserted in the documents.
This last formulation, conceptually, would also include any documentation prepared by the taxpayer's agent, attorney, or other
representative.
The leading case on testimonial communication is
4 3 3 After explaining that the fifth amendSchmerber v. California.
ment "protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of
a testimonial or communicative nature, 4 34 the Court held that
blood extracted from a nonconsenting suspect, "although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither [his] testimony
nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by
435
[him. Thus,] it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds".
Therefore, without precisely defining what constituted evidence
of a "testimonial or communicative nature", the Court expressly
rejected Wigmore's formulation of the scope of the fifth amend436
ment privilege.
The greatest judicial confusion, however, has come in the
area of determining what documents owned by an individual can
be compelled by governmental authorities as evidence for use in
a criminal prosecution. In Boyd v. United States,437 the Supreme
Court held that compelling the defendent in a forfeiture proceeding to produce invoices for proof of the quantity and value of
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 31 (1966).
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§118-121 (2nd ed. 1972).
384 U.S. 757 (1966). See text accompanying notes 198-207 supra.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 763.
116 U.S. 616 (1886). See text accompanying notes 188-90 supra.
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glass, allegedly improperly imported, was a violation of the defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights. The confusion which
surrounds much of the foregoing discussion has arisen out of a
later misinterpretation of the Court's language in that case:43
[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict
him of a crime. . . is within the condemnation of [the fifth
amendment].
[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself.
At the least, Boyd suggests that a search pursuant to a search
warrant for private books and papers of an individual is as equally
compulsive as a subpoena of a person's private papers. This holding appears to be the antithesis of the position taken in Couch
and White, which apparently perceived an administrative subpoena of a person's personal papers as something less than a
compulsory extortion of potentially incriminating evidence.43
44 the
In Gilbert v. California,
Supreme Court held that the
taking of handwriting samples is a form of compulsion within the
meaning of the fifth amendment, but that "[a] mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like
the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic
outside its protection" because it is not the kind of "communication" covered by the privilege.44 [Emphasis added]
Following the reasoning of the lower courts, one might have
expected the Supreme Court in Schmerber to hold that there was
no compulsion involved in taking the blood sample. Schmerber
438. Id. at 630.
439. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL, §665 n.88 (1969):
It is much less clear that such a distinction [betweeen the compulsion procedure
by a subpoena and that produced by a search warrant] would be sound or fully
consistent with the interests protected by the privilege against selfincrimination.
See also, Lipton, Search Warrantin Tax FraudInvestigations, 56 A.B.A.J. 941, 943 (1970):
"It is unthinkable that the courts will grant carte blanche for the seizure of documents
that could not be reached by administrative or judicial subpoena." Vonder Ahe v. How.
land, 31 AFTR 2d 73-1075 (9th Cir. 1973); Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
440. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). For a complete discussion of search warrants in federal
income tax cases, see notes 205-06, 211, 217 and accompanying text.
441. Id. at 266-67.
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was in no way forced to make "assurance, compelled as an incident of the process, that the articles produced [were] the ones
demanded." 4 2 Furthermore, the nature of the blood sample taken
was such that "the proof of [its] authenticity, or other circumstances affecting [it], may and must be made by testimony of
other persons, without any employment of the accused's oaths or
testimonial responsibility" 4 3 The Schmerber Court, however, as
noted above, expressly held that the taking of a blood sample over
a suspect's objection was "compulsion" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.444
Compulsion alone, however, is not enough to constitute a
fifth amendment violation. As noted in Schmerber, "compulsion
to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to
write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture"4'45 is
not prohibited under the fifth amendment:
The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different
ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony', but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not
violate it."'
In Schmerber, the Court expressly noted that "[c]ompulsion of responses which are also communications, for example,
compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers . . .,,,447 is
within the fifth amendment privilege. [Emphasis added]. One
year after the Schmerber decision, in Warden v. Hayden,44 the
Court overruled the much criticized "mere evidence" rule of
Gouled v. United States449 and upheld the admission of certain
evidence despite the petitioner's fifth amendment claims. The
442. 8 WIC.MORE,

EVIDENCE

§2264 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).

443. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
444. Id. at 761.
445. Id. at 764.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also 18 U.S.C. §3103 which states:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any property
(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means
of committing a criminal offense; or
(3) Possessed, controlled, or designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §957.
449. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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objects seized in Hayden were trousers, a jacket and a cap, items
previously immune from seizure under Gouled. The Court's opinion, however, contained a very significant caveat:45
The items of clothing. . .are not 'testimonial' or 'communicative' in nature, and their introduction did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757.
This case thus does not require that we consider whether there
are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them
from being object of a reasonable search and seizure.
In contrast, California v. Byers,45 ' held that it would be an
"extravagant" extension of the privilege to apply the fifth amendment to a California statute declaring it illegal for a motorist to
fail to stop after an accident and to furnish his name and address.
The Court held that the requirement of stopping is no more testimonial than requiring a person to speak or walk and that the
disclosure requirement is essentially a neutral, non-testimonial
452
act.
Although the Supreme Court has never discussed in a positive fashion what criteria delineate testimonial communication
from nontestimonial, it is apparent from a close reading of Couch
that the personal documents of a taxpayer are testimonial. However, the compulsion necessary to trigger the "private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought" which the fifth amendment seeks to protect may be lacking where the taxpayer has
surrendered possession of the documents or disclosed their contents as required by law. 453 As indicated previously, this result
bears little relationship, in the mind of this author, either to the
reality of what constitutes compulsory self-incrimination or to
what the fifth amendment means. There is little doubt that a
taxpayer's personal records are testimonial no matter what criteria are used. There is no legal justification for describing possession as a criteria for determining whether or not the "private
inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought" is violated when
the personal property of a taxpayer is appropriated against the
450. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1967). See note accompanying the
recently proposed amendment to FED. R. CRIM. P. in 48 F.R.D. 629-30 (1970). See also
Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 31 AFTR 2d 73-1075 (1973).
451. 402 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971).
452. Id. at 431. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
453. 409 U.S. 322 (1972).
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taxpayer's will to be used against him in "testimonial fashion"
in an income tax fraud investigation.
IV.

THE TAXPAYER AND HIS ACCOUNTANT

There is no recognized privilege running between an accountant and his client in either common law or federal law when
dealing with income tax investigation.4 54 In order to protect communications to accountants, the communications must be
brought within the scope of other categories of privileges or the
courts or Congress will have to provide for an accountant-client
privilege. Although the application of these techniques is severely
limited, there are situations where documents prepared by an
accountant are protected by the attorney-client privilege. 55
The tests which have been frequently used by the courts to
determine the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the
accountant or his workpapers are whether or not an attorney has
been retained by the taxpayer prior to the accountant's preparation of the workpapers, and whether it was the attorney or the
client who directed their preparation, and what the purpose of the
45 6
accountant's work was.
A.

The Client's Accountant

It seems clear that where the accountant is retained by the
client prior to consultation with an attorney, there is no attorneyclient privilege with respect to the communications or workpa-

pers of the accountant.45 7 This result follows logically since the
454. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Post, 72-2 USTC 9626 (E.D.
Ky. 1972). On occasion taxpayers have attempted without much success to raise the
accountant-client privilege by virtue of state law. See United States v. Tuskuno, 341 F.
Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Linton, 72-2 USTC 9754 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
455. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir. 1961); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D.
Pa. 1973); United States v. Jacobs, 322 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1971); United States v.
Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Md. 1971). But cf. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175
F.2d 924, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d
297 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

456. See generally How To HANDLE TAX AuDrrs, REQUESTS FOR RULINGS, FRAUD CASES
AND OTHER PROCEDURE BEFORE THE I.R.S. 127-34 (I. Schreiber ed. 1967); Lofts, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19 TAX L. REv. 405, 412 (1964);
Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in InternalRevenue Service Investigations,54 MINN.
L. REv. 67, 86 (1969); Cohen, Accountant's Workpapers in FederalTax Investigations, 21
TAX L. REV. 182, 192 (1966).
457. It is entirely clear from the record . . . that the documents . . . were
either disclosed to the accountant . . . or produced by [the accountant], prior
to their delivery to counsel. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that no
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client's communication was not made to an attorney or to an
accountant working under the direction of an attorney, either as
the attorney's employee or agent. Furthermore, since the workpapers are subject to discovery in the hands of the accountant, the
courts have been unwilling to deny discovery where the documents have been transferred directly to the client's attorney. 5 s
The premier case upholding discovery where the accountant
has transferred workpapers to the client's attorney is Bouschor v.
United States,459 where workpapers and returns were prepared by
an accountant for several years prior to consultation with an attorney. Subsequent to the tax investigation, the attorney instructed the accountant to transfer all workpapers to him. The
attorney was then summoned to produce the material he had
received. He declined, contending, inter alia, that the papers
were privileged communications. The court weighed the prior
preparation of the workpapers, the fact that they had already
been reviewed by the Service and reasoned that no confidential
communication by the client to an attorney existed, and, thus,
the privilege was inapplicable. More important, the court found
that ownership of the documents and workpapers lay with the
accountant and not with the taxpayer, in spite of the rather clear
permanent partition of the documents from the accountant.,"
The question of the taxpayer's possession, constructive or actual,
as previously indicated, weighs heavily on assessing the validity
of a fifth amendment self-incrimination claim, which may on
occasion be used by the attorney to prevent discovery of documents in his hands.46 1 Therefore, the Supreme Court in Couch v.
privilege can subsequently arise.
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (N.D. Cal. 1956). See also Bouschor v. United
States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) and Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956).
458. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, rehearingdenied, 73-2 USTC 9802 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973); and United States
v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
459. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
460. Id. at 456. See text accompanying notes 228-48, 360-71, and 424-27 supra for a
discussion of ownership and possession.
461. The workpapers of an accountant are presumed to be his property. Cf. United

States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68,
70 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383, 385 (6th
Cir. 1961); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States
v. Boccoto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir.
1960). If the taxpayer was rightfully in possession of the accountant's workpapers they
might be protected. See, United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v.
Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1967); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 103 (N.D.
Cal. 1956).
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United States6 2 may have overruled, sub silentio, Bouschor.
In Couch, the taxpayer's accountant was in possession of the
taxpayer's records for many years prior to the issuance of the
summons. Mrs. Couch contended that ownership rather than possession defined the boundaries of protection afforded by the fifth
amendment. The Court found that the taxpayer's accountant
rather than the taxpayer herself was actually in possession of the
documents sought by the government. As a result, the taxpayer
could not legitimately claim that enforcing the summons would
compel her to incriminate herself. The Court concluded that the
ingredient of personal compulsion, essential to a claim of privilege, is almost invariably missing unless the papers are actually
in the taxpayer's possession. The following remarks by the majority are particularly revealing:463
We do indeed believe that actual possession of documents bears
the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against governmental compulsions upon the individual
accused of crime. Yet situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is
so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact. But this is not the
case before us.
One lesson to be drawn from Couch, then, is that unless the
taxpayer is actually in possession of documents owned by him or
prepared by another-or is clearly in constructive possession-he
will be unable to invoke the shelter of the fifth amendment. This
doctrine was followed in United States v. White," 4 where the
taxpayer's attorney had been in possession of documents previously prepared by taxpayer's accountant.
B. The Attorney's Accountant
After Couch, it has become settled law that there exists no
462. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
463. Id. at 333-34.
464. 477 F.2d 757, rehearing denied, 73-2 USTC 9802 (5th Cir. 1973). The White
court used a test of one instant of possession in the hands of the taxpayer to defeat the
claim of constructive possession:
ITIhis conception of constructive possession cannot be extended to fit the
situation in which White's clients find themselves. For it is undisputed that they
have never for an instant been in possession of the papers sought by the government ....
Although not of controlling importance, there is no evidence in the
record that he did so upon their instructions or that they even knew that he had
secured them. Id. at 763-64; see also Judge Ainsworth's dissent at 73-2 USTC
1[9802 at 82,594.
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privilege, constitutional or otherwise, with respect to testimony,
workpapers or even the taxpayer's own papers held indefinitely
by the taxpayer's accountant. The result is less clear where the
accountant is employed directly by the attorney or by the client
at the attorney's request. An early case dealing with the question
is Himmelfarb v. United States,4 65 where the attorney retained an
accountant who not only performed various accounting services
but was present at meetings between the taxpayer and the attorney. The accountant's testimony was objected to on the ground
that the accountant was an agent of the attorney and therefore
the communications between the attorney's client and the accountant were privileged."' The Court reasoned differently, however, stating:467
[The accountant's] presence was not indispensable in the sense
that the presence of an attorney's secretary may be. It was a
convenience which, unfortunately for the accused, served to
remove the privileged character of whatever communications
were made.
Although this decision was strongly, and rightly, criticized,
it was subsequently approved by the Sixth Circuit in Gariepy v.
United States.4 6
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Kovel,6 0 took a different approach by expanding the scope of the attorney-client
privilege to cover agents or employees with more than "menial or
ministerial" duties. In Kovel, the accountant was a full time
employee of a law firm specializing in tax matters. The attorney
instructed the client to turn over his records to the accountant
along with any necessary explanation of the matters included in
the documents. During the course of an investigation the accountant refused to divulge the documents or the contents of his conversations with the client on the ground that the communications
were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court rejected both the government's argument that non-lawyer employees were not covered by the privilege and the accountant's argu465. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 860 (1949).
466. Id. at 938-39.
467. Id. at 939; accord, Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See Peterson,
Attorney-Client Privilegein InternalRevenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67,
88 (1969) and Lourie and Cutler, Lawyer's Engagement of Accountant in a Federal Tax
Fraud Case, 10 TAX L. REV. 227 (1954).
468. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).
469. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/7

44

et al.: Part III: Student Comment: The Attorney-Client Privilege

Tax Symposium-Part III
ment that any communication by a client to any employee of a
law firm was privileged.170 The court viewed as the essential element that "the communication be made in confidence for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer" 7 Applying
472
this principle to the facts of the case, the court reasoned:
Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers in
almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases. Hence
the presence of an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or
by the client, while the client is relating a complicated tax story
to the lawyer, ought not destroy the privilege . .. ; the presence
of the accountant is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the
effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which
the privilege is designed to permit. By the same token, if the
lawyer has directed the client, either in the specific case or
generally, to tell his story in the first instance to an accountant
engaged by the lawyer, who is then to interpret it so that the
lawyer may better give legal advice, communications by the
client reasonably related to that purpose ought fall [sic] within
the privilege; there can be no more virtue in requiring the lawyer
to sit by while the client pursues these possibly tedious preliminary conversations with the accountant than in insisting on the
lawyer's physical presence while the client dictates a statement
to the lawyer's secretary. [emphasis added]
The Ninth Circuit followed Kovel in United States v.
Judson, 73 overruling, sub silentio, its much criticized earlier
decision in Himmelfarb. In Judson, the taxpayer's attorney requested that an accountant be retained by the taxpayer to prepare a net worth statement necessary for the attorney to provide
adequate representation for the client during the course of an
income tax investigation. The attorney was subpoenaed to produce the accountant's working papers as well as the net worth
statement. The court upheld the attorney's claim of privilege,
summarily stating:

47 4

470. Id. at 920-23. Contra, United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967)
where it was held that an appraiser's report by an employee for possible use in a tax
investigation was not privileged.
471. 296 F.2d at 922.
472. Id.
473. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); accord, United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297 (9th
Cir. 1973); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill.
1972); United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W.Va. 1966).
474. 322 F.2d at 462. Note, this language rejects the view that the accountant could
not be an "indispensible party to attorney-client communications." Accord, United States
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The accountant's role was to facilitate an accurate and complete
consultation between the client and the attorney about the former's financial picture. The lower court was correct in determining that these documents constituted confidential communications within the attorney-client privilege.
Many recent decisions incorrectly avoid this result. In United
States v. Cote,'45 the taxpayer had employed Cote for several
years as an independent contractor to prepare his income tax
returns. After an Internal Revenue Service investigation had
begun, the taxpayer consulted an attorney who retained the taxpayer's accountant to audit the taxpayer's books and records.
Upon completion of the audit, counsel recommended that the
taxpayer file an amended return, which was done. A special agent
subsequently summoned the accountant to testify and produce
all workpapers. The accountant did not comply. The court overturned the holding of the district court and held that the
attorney-client privilege attached to the accountant's workpapers
but that the privilege had been waived:" '6
[W]e find that by filing the amended returns the taxpayer
communicated, at least in part, the substance of that information to the government, and they must now disclose the detail
underlying the reported data. A client may waive the privilege
which protects what he earlier confided to his attorney ...
If this result be correct, any attempt by the taxpayer to cure
the "omission" through professional assistance could result in the
discovery of nearly certain evidence of criminal culpability, which
could be discovered and used by the government in a criminal
proceeding. 47 It is doubtful that Congress ever intended that the
amended return procedure have such far reaching results.
A recent post-Couch case, United States v. Schmidt,"8 dealt
with the scope of the attorney-client privilege where an attorney
v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972). See also United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297 (9th
Cir. 1973) and United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
475. 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
476. Id. at 144-45. Waiver per se is not often an issue in income tax cases involving
the attorney-client privilege since the privilege does not attach to information which the
taxpayer intends his attorney to report in the contents of a tax return. See United States
v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp.
324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962).
477. But cf. United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970). See generally,
Edgar, Tax Records, The Fifth Amendment and the "Required Records Doctrine", 9 ST.
Loi,,s U.L.J. 502 (1965).
478. 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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had retained independent accountants to aid him in the giving
of tax and financial advice to a client. The court recognized that
the accountant's work could fall within the attorney-client privilege but so narrowed the protection afforded thereunder that the
privilege was effectively neutralized. Using the no-confidentiality
concept, the court permitted the government access to the following information: (1) the identities of the persons who aided in the
preparation of the taxpayer's return and the nature of the services
provided; (2) the amount of fees paid to the accounting firm; (3)
the sources of information used to prepare the returns; (4) the
disposition of all books and records and accountant's workpapers
used in the preparation of the returns; (5) a detailed description
workpapers used in the preparation of
of all books, records and
479
return.
the taxpayer's
It is evident that much of the information which the court
found "not confidential" and not protected by the attorney-client
privilege relates to matters which both the taxpayer and his attorney believed to be confidential.This is especially true with regard
to the sources and substance of the workpapers prepared by the
accountants. The court, in dealing with these matters, stated: 80
The workpapers should be protected insofar as they record
client's confidential communications: but much of the information contained in them may have come from unprotected
sources, and a blanket claim of testimonial immunity arising
from a consultative employment relationship falls short of meeting respondents' burden to establish that the specific information they desire to withhold is within the scope of the privilege.
Accordingly, Schmidt must disclose the sources of information contained in his workpapers; to the extent they are unprotected, the substance of it must be revealed.
It is apparent from the discussion, and the cases cited above
that, under proper circumstances, an accountant's testimony and
workpapers could fall within the scope of the attorney-client priv479. The court required the accountants to answer, interalia, the following questions:
10A. Describe in detail the workpapers, memoranda and notations compiled
in preparation of this 1969 return.
B. What disposition was made of those workpapers?
C. Where are the workpapers now?
D. Are they available?
E. For Internal Revenue Service review?
F. If not, why not?
United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 352 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
480. Id. at 351.
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ilege if proper precautions are taken by counsel. If an accountant
is retained by the attorney to provide technical service and advice
to aid the attorney in making legal judgments, the communications to the accountant and the accountant's workpapers will fall
within the attorney-client privilege. It would also be difficult for
a court to force production of the accountant's workpapers and
the taxpayer's personal documents if they are in the possession
of the taxpayer. 8 ' Although these technical requirements place
an undue burden on the taxpayer, it is unfortunately necessary
that they be followed religiously if the government is to be denied
access to potential evidence which the taxpayer expects to be
confidential.
C.

The Attorney PerformingExtra-Legal or Non-Legal Services
and the Attorney Preparer

As originally indicated, not all communications between an
attorney and his client are privileged.4 2 The attorney must have
been acting in his capacity as a professional legal advisor at the
time the disclosures were made.
[A]ttorneys frequently give to their clients business or other
advice which, at least insofar as it can be separated from their
essentially professional legal services, gives rise to no privilege
whatever.4
It seems clear then that where the attorney gives investment
advice," 4 handles financial transactions,48 5 or acts as a mere
481. The attorney-client privilege would be inapplicable. However, the taxpayer
would be correctly asserting a claim of fifth amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. The ownership-possession criteria enabling the taxpayer to assert the fifth
amendment are as follows:
1. Ownership and possession assure a valid assertion of the privilege. Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
2. Ownership or possession may not be enough to invoke the privilege. See United
States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
3. Ownership may be a prerequisite to assertion of the privilege. See Bouschor v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Boccoto, 175 F. Supp. 886
(D.N.J. 1959). But cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 n.12 (1973); United States
v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967).
4. Possession is probably a prerequisite to the assertion of a valid fifth amendment
claim. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. Hickok,
481 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
482. See cases cited at note 259 supra.
483. 8 J. WICMORF, EVIDENCE §2291 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2nd Cir. 1962),cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
484. Cf. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 951 (1963).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/7

48

et al.: Part III: Student Comment: The Attorney-Client Privilege

Tax Symposium-Part III
collection agent or business manager for a client,486 communicative information passed from the client to the attorney is not
privileged. It is, however, not uncommon to find attorneys and
their clients involved in transactions that can be characterized
neither as clearly legal nor clearly nonlegal.1 7 In income tax cases,
the most sensitive situations arise where an attorney, who also
happens to be an accountant, prepares the client's income tax
returns.
An early case dealing with an allegation of privileged com4 8 Although
munication to an attorney-accountant is In re Fisher.
the ttorney-accountant had primarily performed legal services
for his client, the transaction in question dealt with the auditing
of his client's books and the preparation of the workpapers relating to that audit. The court compelled discovery of the records
and workpapers. The test used by the court was that where the
services performed by the professional are characteristically rendered by an accountant, the fact that the accountant happens to
be an attorney does not change the status of what would otherwise be unprivileged communications.
In 0lender v. United States,489 the nature of the services of
the attorney-accountant did not facilitate the use of the Fisher
test. The attorney-accountant had prepared federal tax returns
for the client and a net worth statement pursuant to a request by
the Internal Revenue Service during the course of the subsequent
tax investigation. The court concluded that since the attorneyaccountant was retained to prepare income tax returns and finan4
cial statements the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable. 11
The implication that the preparation of income tax returns was
not within the province of an attorney's legal services was without
prior judicial foundation.4 9 ' If tax return preparation is beyond
the scope of legal services performed by an attorney-accountant,
485. Kelly v. Simon, 9 AFTR 2d 888 (S.D. Cal. 1962). But see In re Schwarz, 56-2
USTC 1110061 (D.D.C. 1956), a/f'd on other grounds, sub nom. Commissioner v. Schwarz,
247 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where it was held that a list of clients provided by a doctor
to an attorney for collection was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
486. Lowy v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1959); Pollock v. United States,
202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953); Toothaker v. Orloff, 4 AFTR 2d
5029 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
487. United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1973).
488. 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). See also United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D.
433 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
489. 51 F.2d at 425.
490. 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
491. Id. at 806.
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logic commands the conclusion that a non-accountant attorney is
not acting in his capacity as a professional legal advisor when he
prepares an income tax return. Tax return preparation would be
characterized as a non-legal service such as financial consultation
or debt collection, and statements made to the attorney could be
used as evidence against the client in a subsequent civil or criminal action against the client. 2 '
A far different analysis of the applicability of the attorneyclient privilege to the preparation of tax returns was advanced by
the Second Circuit in Colton v. United States.49 The government
attempted to compel both testimony and various documents relating to the preparation of the client's federal income tax return.
The attorney appeared before the investigator but refused to give
either testimony or documents, relying on the attorney-client
privilege. The court, assuming that privilege applied, concluded
that some matters under investigation were not privileged. 44
With respect to the workpapers and documents involved, the
9
415
court affirming the district court, held that:
[The attorney could] withhold any particular confidential papers which were 'specifically prepared by the client for the purpose of consultation with his attorney' and any of the firm's
memoranda and worksheets to the extent of any unpublished
expression made by an attorney therein of confidences which
had passed between him and his clients.
The court's analysis is simply that any blanket refusal to
produce testimony or documents is unjustified. Furthermore, the
burden of establishing the confidential nature of the material, in
9
the court's view, is upon the attorney."
This decision has been criticized, with justification, in that
492. See Lofts, .The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19 TAx

L. REv. 405, 434 (1964); Peterson, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service
Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REV. 67, 92 (1969); cf. Canady v. United States, 354 F.2d 849
(8th Cir. 1966). In fairness to the Olender court, it should be pointed out that the attorneyaccountant was an employee of an accounting firm and not actively engaged in the practice of law. In addition an attorney was consulted as to what information should be used
in the net worth statement. These factors tend to put the professional services on the
accountant side of the services test and the court's conclusion is probably justified. See
210 F.2d at 806.
493. 306 F.2d 633 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
494. Such matters as remuneration received and the nature of the services rendered
were held not confidential and thus not protected by the privilege. 306 F.2d 633 at 63738.
495. Id. at 639.
496. Id.
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it places a "serious and unjustified limitation on the privilege". 9
The government should be denied any inquiry which would lead
to disclosure of privileged information or to open additional avenues of proof of the matters protected by the privilege. The issue
of what is privileged and what is not in a federal income tax
investigation is one of the most difficult and sensitive matters in
this area of the law. An in camera inspection by a judge is the
only solution if the issue winds up in court. Most of these matters,
however, are handled in administrative proceedings where disclosure to the government, even if later excluded in a court proceeding, could be seriously damaging to a taxpayer. The solution on
an administrative level, in light of the other sources of information available to the government, should be resolved in favor of
the taxpayer.498
In Threlkeld v. United States, 9' an attorney-certified public
accountant, asserting the attorney-client privilege, refused to testify or to produce documents in connection with an estate tax
return he had prepared. Apparently following the rule of Fisher,
without citation thereto, the court found that since he only held
himself out as an attorney he was entitled to claim the attorneyclient privilege to the extent of its applicability to the communications and documents involved."' 0 With regard to the problem of
what fell within the privilege, the court, relying on Colton, in part
held:50'
Any communication by the client with the understanding
that the information would be inserted in the return must be
divulged . . . The reason is that, with such an understanding,
it could not be intended to be confidential.
497. LoFts, supra note 492, at 420; cf. Cohen, Accountant's Workpapers in Federal
Tax Investigations, 21 TAX L. REv. 183, 192 (1966) and Peterson, supra note 492, at 94.
498. See, United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W.Va. 1966); United
States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). But see, Canaday v. United
States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
499. 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
500. Id. at 326. The court apparently came to the correct conclusion. The mere fact
that a practicing attorney also happens to be a certified public accountant as in Threlkeld
should not deprive his client of the privilege any more than the fact that a practicing
accountant also happens to be an attorney as in Olender should bestow the protection of
the attorney-client privilege upon his client. Cf. LoFTs, How TO HANDLE TAX AuDrrs,
REQUESTS FOR RULINGs, FRAUD CASES
D OTHER PROCEDURES BEFORE THE I.R.S. at 129 (I.
Schreiber ed. 1963), and United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W.Va. 1966)
where an attorney-accountant practicing as an attorney was denied the use of the
attorney-client privilege for documents primarily of an accounting nature.
501. 241 F. Supp. at 326. See text accompanying notes 428-32 and 451 supra for a
larger explanation of the role of the return disclosure theory.
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Information communicated by the client with the direction
that it not be inserted in the return or with the direction that it
be, or not be, so inserted in the discretion and judgment of [the
attorney] need not be divulged ...
Although this decision is more palatable than either Colton
or Olender, it fails to restrict governmental discovery of all "essential" matters disclosed by an attorney except where he has
been directed not to disclose or has been given discretion in selecting what information should be reported in the return. The
difficult question is who decides whether the client did or did not
restrict or give carte blanche approval for disclosure or nondisclosure? If the Service is to decide that question on an administrative level, all the difficulties raised by Colton once again
overshadow the availability of the attorney-client privilege. 2
A blatantly superficial analysis and commensurately super0 3 where
fluous result can be found in Canady v. United States,"
an attorney practicing as such prepared income tax returns for a
client under investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. The
taxpayer sought the protection of the attorney-client privilege to
prevent the attorney from disclosing information or documents in
his possession. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, affirming the holding of the district court, held that the privilege
was inapplicable since the attorney "had acted not as a lawyer,
but merely as a scrivener for defendant." ' 4 It is difficult to believe
that a person would retain counsel merely to copy numbers from
one paper to another. Certainly, the expectation of a taxpayer in
hiring an attorney to prepare his return is that the attorney will
use his skill and legal judgment to minimize taxes and to prepare
an accurate return."' In addition to suffering from weakness of
logic, the two cases cited by the court in support of its decision
are either in direct contradiction or inapposite. Falsone v. United
States" ' involved not an attorney, but an accountant who unsuccessfully attempted to gain recognition of an accountant-client
privilege. Colton v. United States,"7 it will be remembered, in502.
503.
504.
505.
633 (2nd
F.2d 734
506.
507.
supra.

See text accompanying notes 372-86 infra.
354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 857.
See Comment in 33 Mo. L. REV. 122 (1968); cf. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) and Falsone v. United States, 205
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 964 (1953).
306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). See notes 372-86
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volved the successful claim of the attorney-client privilege where
the court specifically recognized that tax return preparation was
"sufficiently within the professional competence of an attorney to
' 508
make [it] prima facie subject to the attorney-client privilege.
Thus, framed in both logic and precedent, the decision in Canady
proclaiming income tax preparation as the work of a "scrivener"
is impossible to support.
CONCLUSION

The confusion which exists in this area is the direct result of
a tripartite theory of law which expects: accountant-preparers to
be knowledgeable in tax matters and yet to be accessible to the
government prodding into their clients' affairs; attorneyaccountant preparers to be knowledgeable in tax matters and
semi-accessible to government investigations into their clients'
affairs; and attorneys to be knowledgeable in tax matters and
willing to allow the government to decide whether the government should prod into their clients' affairs. An analysis of what
should be privileged for all professionalpreparersshould include
a limited privilege to refuse disclosure on all matters or materials
brought to their attention by the client in aid of the preparation
of income tax returns. The privilege should also extend to any
materials prepared by the professional return preparer bearing
any relationship to their clients' income tax returns. This result
should be compelled because the government has broad discovery
techniques available without its being necessary to invade a relationship that carries with it an expectation of privacy in matters
generally too complex for the unsophisticated average citizen. It
is likely that the absence of professional guidance in the preparation of returns would result in greater tax fraud than now exists
merely because of the complexity of the law and the inability of
most non-professionals to interpret correctly the statutes and regulations.
508. 306 F.2d 637.
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